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If we are to believe some business scholars, corporate governance is a very old thing – as 
old as the seventeenth century and the first joint-stock companies.1 Others point to Adam 
Smith’s recognition of the ‘other people’s money’ problem or cite Berle and Means’s 
classic analysis of the US securities industry in the roaring 20s as foundational 
contributions to the idea.2 Yet the expression ‘corporate governance’ was not widely used 
before the 1980s; as corporate governance pioneer Bob Tricker has recently stressed ‘back 
in the 1970s the world wasn’t using the phrase “corporate governance” at all … the work of 
the board was hardly thought of at all’.3 Tracing the history of corporate governance back 
into prior decades or even centuries would seem to represent a failure to heed the axiom 
regarding anachronistic vocabulary which is usually attributed to Lord Acton: ie it is wrong 
to describe historical phenomena with terms that did not exist at that time. 
Of course sometimes it is merely a matter of change in vocabulary which leads to 
Acton’s ‘expressive anachronism’.4 The invention of the term ‘sexism’ meant a powerful 
redefinition of a social phenomenon, for example, but it mostly served to replace a less 
direct terminology – ie ‘male chauvinism’. Sexism had long existed, but giving it this label 
sharpened and defined the issue and concern. Nonetheless it has long been regarded as a 
truism in broader historical discourse that it is methodologically wrong blithely to use the 
terminologies characteristic of one era to describe comparable phenomena from others – 
such lexical anachronism often serves to confuse and hinder rather than enhance historical 
analysis. Indeed in the case of corporate governance it would seem reasonable to contend 
that the nature of the issues concerning shareholder rights and the proper limits to power 
and authority that obtain in listed companies has been so transformed in recent decades it 
seem rather ahistorical to include, say, reports from the Dutch East India Company in a 
monographic collection on the history of ‘corporate governance’.5 
It might first be pointed out that the widespread use of the term ‘corporation’ itself is 
a relatively recent development – in countries like Australia, the description substantially 
represents an Americanism. In the 1960s, national corporations legislation was 
encompassed in the Unified Companies Acts of the Australian states, policing of this 
regulation being a matter for companies’ registrars as well as police fraud squads and the 
courts. The expression ‘corporate governance’ was quite unknown in Australia in 1981 
when the National Companies and Securities Commission (the predecessor to the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission) first opened its doors.6 In fact its first 
chairman, commercial lawyer Leigh Masel (1981-85), asked me a few years ago where I 
thought corporate governance came from. He suggested that its emergence could be 
ascribed to the extension of consumer protection law to the securities markets, much as the 
National Companies and Securities Commission (NCSC) was modelled on the Australian 
Trade Practices Commission (established by the Whitlam government in 1974).7 
This is not to deny that issues regarding the legal duties of company officers and 
inefficiencies which may arise with managerial agency have not been longstanding issues 
in legal and economic literature. But one looks in vain for a synonym for ‘corporate 
governance’ in commentaries or analyses of company law or industrial/organisational 
economics before the 1980s. It is as if the modern concept of corporate governance was too 
ill defined to warrant a generally accepted description 30 years ago. The lack of an earlier 
description for what is now called corporate governance is surely more than just a question 
of historical semantics. 
The terms company and corporation are synonyms in Australia, but such is not the 
case in the United States. Under current US law, limited liability companies (LLCs) are 
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closer to what are called partnerships in Britain and Australia; the first Australian 
Corporations Act is a product of the time that also saw managing directors renamed Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs).8 Indeed the establishment of the NCSC (upon the 
recommendation of 1974’s Rae Report) was one of the first significant steps towards 
reforming Australian legislative arrangements in the companies and securities area along 
American lines. The inaugural commission’s chairman deliberately sought out American 
advice – Australia’s laissez-faire regulatory framework modelled on the English system had 
largely been discredited by the corporate scandals of the 1970s associated with the late 60s 
nickel boom.9 But the many reforms of the Australian regulatory system of the 1970s and 
80s were not achieved under the umbrella of ‘corporate governance’ – that term was first 
used in this sense (and in an American context) in the early 80s and did not begin to be 
employed in Australia until the 1990s. 
Hence the NCSC did not recognise that its role included oversight of ‘corporate 
governance’ – the term did not form part of the vocabulary of the public discourse of the 
country’s first national corporate regulator. The adjective ‘corporate’ was well established 
of course, as was the notion of companies and securities regulation, investigation and 
oversight. But the common bundling of ‘corporate’ with ‘governance’ was a linguistic 
development of the 1990s. Nonetheless more had evidently changed in the companies and 
securities area than just the vocabulary.  
After all, ‘governance’ is itself a fairly recent term – or at least it is a term which has 
only become fashionable lately. In 1960, American business scholar Richard Eells, for 
example, wrote of ‘corporate governance’ in a manner that an earlier author – a Weber or a 
Fayol – typically spoke of ‘authority’, ‘rules’ or a ‘scalar chain’.10 Eells was not interested 
in agency costs or the duties owed to shareholders by company comptrollers – neither the 
modern legal view of corporate governance nor the economic is evident in Eells’s work. 
Rather, it would seem that Eells’s use is a nonce formation (styled on ‘corporate 
government’), one which has little to do with present-day characterisations, usages or 
forms. 
Michel Foucault’s influence may be suspected in the growing use of the description 
‘governance’ to refer to a range of political and social issues that previously were dubbed 
‘government’, ‘rationalisation’ or ‘control’. Indeed Foucault’s argument that a mentalité of 
governance – of ‘the conduct of conduct’ – is a characteristic feature of modern society (ie 
that all manner of social and cultural expressions have been prone to be subject to 
increasing discourses and acts of governance since early modern times) seems particularly 
obvious in the case of the development of the contemporary notion of corporate 
governance.11 Where once management theorists such as the Taylorists focussed on 
rationalising and controlling methods of production, and others theorised the managerial 
relationships required in organisations with complex (eg decentralised) structures, corporate 
governance has put the focus on improving the function of the very top levels of 
management, with individual directors, senior executives and even boards (as a whole) 
themselves now increasingly subject to all sorts of evaluation, training and control. This 
certainly is the view of Henry Bosch, the Nestor of Australian corporate governance, who 
largely sees corporate governance in terms of subjecting company directors to the same 
kind of scrutiny as lower levels of management and other employees have much longer 
been accustomed to.12 Bosch’s view of corporate governance as a development of 
management (rather than legal or economic) theory represents a quite different view of 
corporate governance than that held by many legal or economics scholars. 
The example of Eells, however, shows that the first employments of the expression 
‘corporate governance’ were not consistent even in American English use. After all, the 
first continuous use of the terminology appeared in a series of proposed principles for 
corporate law reform that were prepared by the jurists of the American Law Institute in the 
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early 1980s in light of several decades of calls for improvement in the performance of 
corporate boards. This clearly represented a more recognisable usage of the expression 
‘corporate governance’ from a present-day perspective, but it was one that was quite 
divorced from 1970s economic theory and represented a response that was considered 
distinctly partisan by both many legal scholars and industry participants at the time. First 
introduced in terms of a liberal legal project, the American Law Institute’s notion of 
corporate governance seemed more to grow out of the US’s corporate social responsibility 
debates of the 1970s than it did from management or financial circles.13 Later to be adopted 
by the American shareholder movement that is sometimes claimed to be epitomised in the 
figure of leading US corporate governance advocate Robert Monks, this early American 
notion of corporate governance was quite different in both political and intellectual 
character to that which was to develop so influentially internationally in the 1990s.14 
In the UK, management scholar Bob Tricker instead first used the description 
‘corporate governance’ as the title of a book published in 1984 on the ‘practices, 
procedures, and powers in British companies and their boards of directors’, his usage 
indicating a focus more on upper management practice rather than the broader corporations 
and securities regulatory (or even theoretical economic) focus evident in contemporary 
American employments.15 Yet the current usage of the term to apply to both what have 
been styled the macro- (ie regulatory) and micro- (ie company-internal) levels of corporate 
governance is largely a development of the 1990s.16 The expression ‘corporate governance’ 
in 1991’s Bosch Report, prepared by a collection of leading executives in light of the 
spectacular Australian financial scandals of the late 1980s, heads only one of three sections 
in the World’s first corporate governance code.17 It was not until 1992’s Cadbury Report 
appeared that the description ‘corporate governance’ clearly came to be used to refer more 
broadly to the entire (ie both regulatory/financial and internal) ‘system by which companies 
are directed and controlled’.18 
The Cadbury Report expressly brought together matters relating to the roles and 
duties of company directors and concerns over the depth and quality of company reporting. 
And although Cadbury has hailed Tricker as the British Nestor of corporate governance, the 
field as it exists today if anything most publicly represents a reform movement from within 
the commercial world, one which aims to improve practices surrounding the issuance, 
ownership and trading of securities, the control and cash rights of shareholders, assessment 
of corporate risk, remuneration and overall management performance and strategy, as well 
as relations with the various parties (or stakeholders) to which directors and other officers 
of public corporations owe legal, fiducial and moral duties.19 In his memoir of his time at 
the NCSC published in 1990, Bosch characterises much of what he saw as wrong with 
1980s Australian business culture as due to poor ethical standards, ones which above all 
undermined confidence in the local securities markets.20 Yet by the mid-1990s, ethics had 
been replaced by governance for Bosch; the term ‘corporate governance’ had begun to be 
seen by that time as a title under which all sorts of issues surrounding power and conduct 
and the senior management of listed companies could be considered and analysed.21 
Discussions of corporate governance from the 1980s do not use the expression other than in 
what from the perspective of ten years later would largely seem to be an etiolated and 
fragmented manner – concepts such as stakeholders of business, for example, had existed in 
some form or another since at least the 1930s, but such a notion seemed not to feature in the 
vocabulary of company boards, executives or securities regulators until it was developed in 
an influential manner by business ethicist Ed Freeman in 1984.22 The neo-classical notion 
that markets for corporate control were efficient constraints on poorly performing 
management teams largely fell out of favour at the end of the 1980s and economic 
approaches such as Oliver Williamson’s transaction cost economics (which understands 
corporations as a ‘governance form’) or Jensen and Meckling’s agency theory (which also 
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first appeared in the mid-1970s) represented only baby steps towards developing modern 
conceptualisations of corporate governance, performance and control.23 Yet the strongest 
influence on the emergence of corporate governance as a fact on the ground was corporate 
scandal and (particularly in Australia) a feeling that some executive teams had increasingly 
come to be seen as reckless and unaccountable – out of anyone’s control. Concerned 
overtly with stability and the reputation of the British and Australian securities industries, 
corporate governance in its fuller meaning first emerged as a mainstream (rather than left-
liberal) reaction to unethical and egregious managerial behaviour enabled by the 
development of a profound power imbalance (first recognised by Berle and Means) which 
had seen unscrupulous executives come to dominate (and treat with contempt) 
shareholders, regulators and company boards. 
The emergence of activist institutional shareholders like the Californian Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) had already seen a growing sense of reform 
emerging in the US that did not have its roots in calls for corporate law reform. But it was 
the business scandals associated with the collapse of the commercial empires of the 
Australian ‘paper entrepreneurs’ of the late 1980s which saw the first substantial attempt at 
a nation-wide reassessment of broader corporate practice.24 At a time when capital markets 
were becoming increasingly globalised, poor corporate governance could be seen as a 
national industrial concern. The question ‘Who would invest in a foreign capital market 
with a reputation for weak regulation and an unseemly tolerance of managerial fraud?’ did 
not seem to apply in America. 
Shortly after retiring from the chairmanship of the NCSC in 1990, former plastics-
industry executive Henry Bosch received a phone call from the Business Council of 
Australia – the peak employer body in the country (founded in 1984). Bosch was asked to 
lead a working group that would seek to establish a set of best-practice principles for 
business conduct in listed firms. Concerned foremost by the damage done to the 
international reputation of the Australian securities market, the working group published its 
pamphlet or code with the endorsement of the Australian Investment Managers Group (now 
part of the Investment and Financial Services Association) in 1991. The Bosch Report, as it 
is usually styled, was the first attempt to establish a set of corporate governance principles – 
and although now something of a historical orphan, was created as a child not of legal or 
institutional activists, but of a collection of the directors and managers of the country’s 
leading listed firms.25 
As Bosch recounts, the Business Council-led working group had to start from scratch 
– there was no such thing in 1990 as a set of basic principles for company directors and 
executives to follow that they could find. Each of the members of the working group had 
learned the art of being a director or executive only in an informal manner. Bosch himself 
was a business school graduate – but his 1950s Swiss commercial education had not 
prepared him for his first directorship in 1972. The relevant sections of the Unified 
Companies Acts were little help and even the American literature seemed largely just to 
bemoan the lack of proper guidance on how to be a director.26 The Bosch Report was 
quickly overtaken, however, by the appearance of a similar document in the UK prepared 
largely at the behest of the accounting industry by a committee led by former chocolate-
industry executive Sir Adrian Cadbury.27 That the Cadbury Report and its successors 
tracked a similar path to the three Australian self-regulatory industry codes which were to 
feature Bosch’s name in the 1990s merely showed that the corporate governance standards 
developed in those documents represented best practice at British and Australian firms, the 
similarity not being much of a surprise when one considers how dependent both Australian 
company law and business practice had always been on its British model. 
Berle and Means’s 1932 book had been adopted as one of the three key sources of 
advice by the early NCSC (the other two being the relevant companies legislation and the 
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Rae Committee’s Report into the dealings of the securities industry, handed down in 
1974).28 But most of the legal standards prevailing at the time concerning shareholders 
rights and the duties of directors had developed from late-nineteenth-century English 
common law, and many of the company-specific bylaws and conventions concerning the 
roles and responsibilities of directors which applied in England and Australia had similarly 
emerged in an unplanned manner in line with the laissez-faire regulatory spirit of the time. 
But the development of a cowboy culture in Australian corporate life during the 1980s was 
the main contributor to the emergence of a corporate governance movement in Australia – 
the Business Council’s move to establish Bosch’s working group was a form of self-
regulation designed partly in the hope that it might see off the threat of imposition of much 
more onerous black-letter law. And the Cadbury Committee’s work in the UK was 
similarly brought into especial prominence by two particularly egregious business scandals 
which were revealed at the time – the emergence of the Robert Maxwell and Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International affairs in 1990-91 brought particular salience to the 
committee’s recommendations to reform British corporate governance practice and 
(especially) reporting at the time.29 Unlike in the US where corporate governance reform 
remained largely a desideratum of liberal lawyers and shareholder activists, it was the 
industry-supported developments of the early 1990s in Australia and the UK which 
emerged as responses to egregious public scandals that led to the first widely accepted 
articulations of what best practice in corporate governance could and should represent. 
Much as had been discovered by Australian stock exchanges during the nickel boom, 
attempts at self-regulation by bourses can easily be undermined if enough executives and 
traders are willing to flout ‘best practice’ conventions. It was a sense of industry crisis and 
shame that enabled the substantial reforms of the Australian securities industry which 
occurred in the 1980s; a similar consensus that something needed to be done led to the 
emergence of the Bosch and Cadbury reports. The major period of reform in US corporate 
governance is a much later development, though. Most obviously articulated in the British 
and Australian best-practice codes of the early 1990s, the corporate governance movement 
that has been most influential internationally is the one that started in parts of the English-
speaking world other than North America. 
Although the US Business Roundtable’s first statement on corporate governance is a 
reaction to the principles proposed by the American Law Institute in 1983, it is clear that 
the most substantial driver of corporate governance reform in the US was the series of 
scandals that emerged in 2001 that are most spectacularly represented by the collapse of 
energy trader Enron.30 Changes in listing rules such as the 1978 New York Stock Exchange 
requirement for listed corporations to have audit committees might broadly be described as 
corporate governance reform, but similar changes to corporations regulation were not seen 
as part of a broad industry agenda for improving corporate performance and control until 
the 1990s.31 It should be remembered that the Sarbannes-Oxley Act post-dates both the East 
Asian financial crisis and the OECD report prepared by a committee chaired by American 
corporate lawyer Ira Millstein which led to the development of the first international 
principles of corporate governance in 1999.32 Despite the initiatives of organisations such 
as the American Law Institute and even longstanding shareholder activists such as Monks, 
the US (as it has been in matters of financial reform more generally) has proved more a 
laggard than a trend setter in many such matters in recent decades. 
After all, it was not until 1997 that the US Business Roundtable prepared a statement 
that supported corporate governance reform. By this date Canada’s Toronto Report, South 
Africa’s first King Report and France’s first Vienot Report had all already appeared and 
similar committees were to recommend corporate governance reform that year in Japan and 
the Netherlands.33 In the wake of the Bosch and Cadbury reports, an international 
movement of reform had clearly emerged from which the American originators of the term 
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could only be seen to be late comers. When the change did come in the US, however, it 
came hard and fast – self-regulation (à la Bosch) would no longer be permitted in the wake 
of Enron et al. Governance has since become such a buzz word in all sorts of economic and 
legal debate one sometimes wonders how scholars ever did without it. But the emergence of 
discourses of governance in the business world have little to do in origin with legal or 
economic theory, but rather to the emergence of an international corporate governance 
movement supported and enabled by leading figures drawn mostly from industry. 
Many of the issues which inform modern debates on corporate governance first 
became apparent in the US; from environmental legislation to the regulation of investment 
funds, US lawmakers and activists have developed a rich legacy of debate and reform in the 
corporate sector. And clearly, the economic, ethical and institutional analyses that have 
proven so important to the emergence of corporate governance theory are largely American 
contributions. Yet now when scandals emerge such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the 
expression ‘corporate governance’ is splattered across the financial pages of countries right 
across the World – and it is not because of American agency that the term has become an 
essential element of the language of business scandal. Where scandals in the corporate 
world were once criticised as mostly due to poor ethical standards, now the expression 
‘corporate governance’ is used in analyses of corporate failure and calls for reform – and 
the key contributions to this development are shared right across the English-speaking 
world.  
Corporate governance is best seen as a movement to improve the performance and 
standards of the directorial and executive teams at the top of listed companies and to 
improve the confidence of international investors in local securities markets. Crystalising as 
a nameable concept first in the early 1990s, the international corporate governance 
movement first emerged in the wake of a series of Australian and British scandals in the 
1980s and 90s, not as some sort of legacy of the events of 2001 or of much earlier climates 
and times. Where once scholars spoke of reform in corporations and securities law or even 
the scalar chains of command which obtained in large public companies, now the term 
‘corporate governance’ has emerged as a catch all to explain all manner of relationships of 
power and influence which are associated with listed entities. Academically, the corporate 
governance movement represents an attempt to bring together a host of different 
perspectives – older legal and moral ones, as well as more recent economic, accounting and 
management concerns – hence the key contributions to the broader topic which have 
stemmed from fields as diverse as financial economics, business ethics and political 
economy. Often used anachronistically to refer to similar issues of the (not always) recent 
past, the emergence of the description ‘corporate governance’ to indicate an intersection of 
several different theoretical, legal and practical aspects of business activity represents a 
transformation in how public companies are typically seen today. Where once governance 
was something restricted to governments of regions and states, with the emergence of 
corporate influence in so many areas of modern life, a new vocabulary has emerged that 
indicates more strongly the core matters of power and responsibility in a corporate 
environment, one that was largely unheralded before the emergence of the transformative 
Australian and British business scandals of the rapidly globalising financial world of the 
late 1980s and early 90s. 
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